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ART OF THE DEAL

Course No. 300H1F

Fall 2004

MATERIALS

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[2] A play on "*deus ex machina*" or "god from the machine" – an improbable plot device that resolves a difficult situation. "*Pretia*" roughly translates to "prices".

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